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Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to understand the effects of influence and reciprocity as 
elements in the determination of executive compensation.  
Methodology - A purposive sample was drawn, which comprised 13 respondents chosen for their 
expertise relating to the determination of executive compensation in state-owned enterprises. A 
semi-structured interview guide was used as the data-gathering instrument. A thematic analysis 
technique was used for data analysis.  
Findings - The findings in this study identified three themes resorting under influence as crucial 
in the process of determining executive compensation, namely an executive’s social capital, 
intellectual capital and social comparison. Two major themes emerged under reciprocity, namely 
the pay-performance relationship and role complexity. Lastly, the political-symbolic role emerged 
as the main theme that described the relationship between influence and reciprocity.  
Practical implication - The findings provide a more detailed description of the process involved 
in determining executive compensation in state-owned enterprises.  
Originality/value - There has been limited if any, empirical study on the process involved in 
setting executive compensation. The limited focus has always been on accounting measures. 
Incorporating the socio-psychological view attempts to provide a more comprehensive and 
conclusive explanation of the process of determining executive pay in theory and practice. 
Keywords: influence, reciprocity, socio-psychology, state-owned enterprises, executive 
compensation. 
Paper type Research paper 
 
 Introduction 
Although research on executive compensation continues to proliferate and determinants of 
executive compensation have received substantial attention from both academics and regulators, 
there is still no interdisciplinary consensus on the primary forces shaping observable patterns of 
executive compensation (Baxamusa 2012; Shaw and Zhang 2010; Tosi et al. 2000; Van Essen, 
Otten and Carberry 2012). The lack of consensus is most visible between scholars in economics 
and finance, who advocate the primacy of market-based explanations and scholars outside these 
two disciplines, who have challenged these explanations and some of their underlying 
assumptions by highlighting the importance of the power of socio-psychological processes in the 
creation of compensation practices (Diprete, Eirich and Pittinsky, 2010). 
Prior to this research, there has been limited, if any, empirical study on the process involved in 
setting executive compensation. The limited focus has always been on accounting measures and 
traditional performance measures such as return on assets, return on equity or market 
performance (stock return) as criteria for determining executive compensation (de Wet, 2012; 
Li, Lou, Wang and Yuan, 2013). However, research by Wu and Wu (2010) found that, except 
for the return on assets indicator, there is no obvious positive correlation between executive 
compensation and other indicators, such as asset convertibility, that represent cash performance 
and the stock yield representing the wealth of shareholders. In particular, the debate on executive 
compensation focuses primarily on how much executives are paid (Fleming and Schaupp, 2012; 
Scholtz and Smit, 2012; Theunissen, 2010) and less on the process that determines executive 
pay. However, discourse on executive compensation needs to focus on socio-psychological 
processes in the determination of executive compensation. According to DiPrete et al. (2010), a 
more conclusive understanding of executive pay would be achieved by considering executive 
pay as an outcome of a social process in which the actors involved have considerable discretion 
to influence the outcomes. 
Branch, Farris and Haskins (2011) capture the social mechanism of pay determination by stating 
that ‘the realities that some compensation outcomes are a result of a negotiation as opposed to a 
quoted market price must be considered’ (p. 83). Similarly, Lorsh and Khurana (2010) contend 
that for senior executives, the compensation arrangements, in reality, depend heavily on 
negotiations between the executive, and usually his attorney, and the compensation committee 
and its advisers. These negotiations cover not only the amounts to be paid but also the form of 
 compensation, as well as the performance metrics, if any, to which these are to be related (Lorsh 
and Khurana, 2010). Incorporating the social and psychological views attempts to provide a more 
comprehensive and conclusive explanation of the process of determining executive pay in theory 
and practice (Otten, 2007). In the same way, this study is designed to explore mechanisms of 
which the socio-psychological elements of influence and reciprocity are explored in the process 
of setting executive compensation. 
 
Influence 
A number of studies have demonstrated that executives can increase their pay beyond what is 
justified by economic determinants through exercising their influence (O'Reilly, Doerr, Caldwell 
and Chatman, 2014; Shin, 2013; Van Essen, Otten and Carberry, 2014). Many of the empirical 
and theoretical propositions in contemporary treatments of influence relate variations in 
influence to other observable variables. For example, studies of the factors associated with 
leadership, the phenomenon of authority, the persuasion effects of different types of 
communication content, the formally defined power structure in an organisation and informal 
relations in a community all assert propositions in which “influence” is a major variable (March 
1957).  
Similarly, in the current study, influence is expressed in terms of the power an executive 
possesses. According to Comier, Lapointer-Antunes and Magnan (2016), one can argue that the 
formal analysis of power within organisations originates from Maximilian Weber’s work on 
bureaucracies. Weber observes that economic power is the predominant form of power for the 
modern capitalist and is derived from economic relations arising from control of the means of 
production (i.e., ownership). Such power is socially constructed and manifests itself in social 
organisations and networks (Cormier et al., 2016; Lukes, 1974; Stammers, 1999). As explained 
by Bebchuck and Fried (2003), managers wield substantial influence over their own pay 
arrangements, and they have an interest in reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and 
the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. However, several 
theories could explain this phenomenon of influence with reference to executive compensation, 
namely the managerial power theory, the figurehead theory and the social comparison theory.  
  
 Managerial power theory 
The managerial power theory argues that executive pay is an outcome of power relationships and 
that pay setters and receivers are able to use discretion in the pay-setting process (Ebert, Torres 
and Papadakis, 2008; Otten, 2007). Chen, Ezzamel and Cai (2011) identified two types of 
executive power, namely structural power and prestige power. Structural power, on the one hand, 
relates to formal positions within an organisation and increases as executives move up the 
hierarchy. The greater an executive's structural power, the greater his/her control over colleagues' 
actions to pursue self-interests, including obtaining more pay. On the other hand, prestige power 
relates to the role of outside directorships and education as key components of prestige, which 
could result in executives receiving more pay (Li, Moshirian, Nguyen and Tan, 2007). Prestige 
power also manifests as the executive’s positional and expert power, which includes the 
manager's ability to absorb uncertainty from the institutional environment (O'Reilly, Doerr, 
Caldwell and Chatman, 2014; Shin, 2013; Van Essen, Otten and Carberry, 2014). Thus, 
executives can use such prestige power to influence and neutralise efforts designed to restrain 
their compensation (Van Essen et al., 2014; Westphal and Zajac, 1995). 
 
Figurehead theory 
The figurehead theory is another theory that would lead to similar predictions. According to this 
theory, an executive, especially the CEO, plays a political/symbolic figurehead role when 
communicating within and outside the organisation (Van Essen, Otten and Carberry, 2014). 
Political connectedness, which is one form of "social capital", consists of resources available 
through political social networks that a CEO can use to influence policy decisions that are in the 
interest of both the executive and the firm (Aslan and Grinstein, 2011).  
Aslan and Grinstein (2011) found that political networks are positively related to levels of 
compensation and negatively associated with pay-performance sensitivity. In particular, the 
results of their study revealed that a political connection is associated with a 9% increase in a 
CEOs’ annual compensation and a 17% decrease in his pay-performance sensitivity, hence the 
complexity of the symbolic political role as a token of the executive’s mandate and ability to 
manage reflects the level of executive pay.  
 
 
 Social comparison theory 
To complement the managerial power theory and the figurehead theory, literature on executive 
compensation also relates to the social comparison theory. Social comparison literature focuses 
on determining which individual or groups are likely to serve as influence and reference when 
determining executive compensation (Boivie, Bednar and Barker, 2015). Social comparison 
theory on executive compensation finds expression in the fundamental and pervasive 
psychological process of social influence.  
Social influence, also referred to as social capital (O’Reilly and Main 2010), refers to the 
resources available through social networks and elite institutional ties (such as club 
memberships) that an individual can use to enhance his or her position (Belliveau, O'Reilly, and 
Wade 1996). Social capital can provide important cues – such as the credibility and attractiveness 
of an executive – that people may use in place of facts when the judgement task is ambiguous 
when deciding on compensation (O’Reilly and Main 2010).  
The social capital of executives influences pay through a process in which executives with 
greater social status or connections than comparison groups receive higher compensation 
(O’Reilly and Main 2010). Therefore, it is likely that the social comparison process of anchoring 
executive pay based on readily available and relevant comparison groups will help to increase 
executive compensation, since individuals would rarely use social referents as justification to 
decrease their pay (Boivie, et al., 2015).  
Following the aforementioned, the current study, therefore, sought to determine the following 
research objective: 
 To investigate the effects of influence in the determination of executive compensation.  
 
Reciprocity 
Another element that applies to the process of determining executive compensation is 
reciprocity. O’Reilly and Main (2010) extend the concept by stating that reciprocity is a 
fundamental norm in all societies and pervades both economic and social life. Norms are social 
expectations of how people ought to behave in a given social context (Bandura, 1991).  As a 
norm, reciprocity dictates that ‘When one party benefits another, an obligation is generated’ 
(Gouldner, 1960, p.174). Reciprocity finds expression in the psychological contract an executive 
enters into with the employer that demonstrates their shared expectations (how one should 
 behave) and sanctions (what happens if one does or does not conform) (O’Reilly and Main, 
2010). The current study, therefore, sought to determine the following research objective: 
 To investigate the effects of reciprocity in the determination of executive compensation. 
 
The relationship between influence and reciprocity as determinants of executive 
compensation 
The relationship between influence and reciprocity in the determination of executive 
compensation is demonstrated by how an executive is rewarded for his/her political 
connectedness, which in turn benefits the organisation. Although Aslan and Grinstein (2011) 
found that political networks are positively related to levels of compensation and negatively 
associated with pay-performance sensitivity, supporting evidence is already available that the 
political social network connectedness of executives increases their compensation, and that 
connection-based pay is positively associated with future performance (Horton, Millo and 
Serafeim, 2012). Similarly, Li et al. (2007) contend that the positive association between 
executives’ political influence and the performance of the firm has also been shown empirically, 
suggesting that increased compensation arising from the executive’s political influence may be 
rooted in increased firm-level performance. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that executives are 
aware of the performance-enhancing benefits of their political influence, and in return, 
organisations may be willing to provide greater compensation because of the associated benefits. 
Politically connected executives may, therefore, demand higher compensation (Aslan and 
Grinstein 2011).  
The relationship between influence and reciprocity is further demonstrated by the nature of 
benefits an executive could derive. For example, one reason politically connected managers may 
be willing to accept less compensation is that they take into consideration the potential 
opportunities of being politically promoted (Aslan and Grinstein, 2011). Even unconnected 
managers may be willing to accept less compensation because working for the organisation may 
allow them to develop their own political connections. Based on the aforementioned, the current 
study, therefore, sought to determine the following research objective: 
 To investigate the relationship between influence and reciprocity in the determination of 
the executive compensation process. 
 The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: The first section describes a summary of the 
methodology followed and presentation of the findings. The paper concludes with a discussion 
of influence and reciprocity, and the relationship between the two constructs in the determination 
of executive compensation. What follows is a description of the methodology and research 
design adopted for the current study. 
 
Methodology 
Several scholars advocate different paradigms (worldviews) and philosophies that underpin 
knowledge production (Bryman and Bell, 2011; Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Habermas, 1972; 
Zikmund, Babin, Carr, and Griffin, 2013). Although there are differences in scholars' advocacy 
of research philosophies that include among others interpretivism, realism, and positivism 
(Saunders et al., 2012; Sekeran and Bougie, 2010; Srivasta and Rego, 2011), a common theme 
is that no knowledge is neutral, and all research is embedded in philosophical preferences. From 
an epistemological stance, this research adopted an interpretivist approach that advocates 
subjective views of the phenomenon under study. 
 
Research design 
A research design refers to the overall research plan. It is a strategic framework for action that 
serves as a bridge between research questions and the execution or implementation of the 
research (Terre Blanche et al. 2006, p. 34). This plan stems from the objective of the study. The 
research design followed in the current study is discussed according to the sub-headings below. 
 
Research strategy 
A research strategy may be defined as a plan of how a researcher will go about answering a 
research question (Saunders et al., 2012). It is the methodological link between the research 
philosophy and subsequent choice of methods to collect and analyse data (Denzin & Lincoln, 
2005). The research strategy employed in this study consisted of a phenomenological study. The 
phenomenological study was employed as a means to understand the perception of key 
informants about executive compensation in the context of South African state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). A researcher applying phenomenology is concerned with the lived 
experiences of the people (Greene, 1997; Holloway, 1997; Kruger, 1988; Kvale, 1996; Maypole 
 and Davies, 2001; Robinson and Reed, 1998) involved, or who were involved, with the issue 
being researched (Groenewald, 2004). According to Giorgi (as cited in Groenewald, 2004) the 
operative word in phenomenological research is ‘describe'. The aim of the researcher is, 
therefore, to describe as accurately as possible the phenomenon, refraining from any pre-given 
framework, but remaining true to the facts. 
 
Participants and setting 
A purposive sample of SOEs was used for the study. In purposive sampling, the sample is chosen 
for a particular purpose (Leedy and Ormrod, 2013, p. 215). The researcher needs to use 
judgement to select cases that will best enable him/her to answer the research question(s) and to 
meet research objectives (Saunders et al., 2012). A key component of a purposive sampling is, 
therefore, the ‘depth' of data in order to gain deeper understanding rather than to generalise or to 
focus on the frequency (O'Reilly and Parker, 2012; Terre Blanche et. al., 2006).  
In order to clarify concerns about the sample size, Cresswell (2007) suggests that a 
heterogeneous population would require between 25 and 30 interviews, while semi-structured/in-
depth interviews require a minimum sample size of between five and 25 (Saunders et al., 2012). 
In this study, the sample was drawn from the directory of South African SOEs, which entails a 
population of more than 700 enterprises. However, only those SOEs that had been categorised 
under Schedule 2 of the Public Finance Management Act of 1999 (PFMA) and fell under the 
Large Group Business Enterprises category, were considered.  
The Schedule 2 group of SOEs consists of 21 SOEs. The reason for selecting only Schedule 2 
enterprises was that they were the only entities among all the South African SOEs that were large 
and competed directly with the private sector in particular.  
However, of the 21 Schedule 2 SOEs, only 13 enterprises were interviewed. A single research 
participant represented each SOE at the interview. The sample size of 13 representatives from 
various SOEs sufficed for the study, since the sample was from a homogenous population (i.e. 
Schedule 2 SOEs).  
  
 Table 1 shows a list of the participants along with information on their position in their 
organisations. 
Table 1: Characteristics of participants 
Interviewee Organisation Position in the organisation Gender & Age 
1 Company 1: - 
Development Finance  
(RP1) 
Group Executive HR Female (33) 
2 Company 2: Development 
Finance (RP2) 
Senior Manager 
Remuneration 
Female (40) 
3 Company 3: Development 
Finance  (RP3) 
Senior Manager Reward and 
Remuneration 
Male (37) 
4 Company 4: Aviation 1 
(RP4) 
Manager Remuneration and 
Benefits 
Female (45) 
5 Company 5: Freight and 
Logistics (RP5) 
Divisional Executive 
Manager HR 
Male (42) 
6 Company  6: Energy (RP6) Manager HR Female (36) 
7 Company 7: 
Telecommunications (RP7) 
Manager HR Female (39) 
8 Company 8:  
Communications (RP8) 
Manager Remuneration Male (40) 
9 Company 9: Aviation  
(RP9) 
Senior Manager Female (46) 
10 Company 10: Aviation 
(RP10) 
Human Resource Manager Male (43) 
11 Company 11: 
Communications (RP11) 
Manager Remuneration Male (45) 
12 Company 12: Energy 
(RP12) 
Remuneration and Rewards 
Manager 
Female (40) 
13 Company 13: Defence 
(RP13) 
Human Resources Manager Female (48) 
*(RP) represents research participant 
 
Data collection 
Data were collected using one-to-one semi-structured interviews (one hour in length) with 
representatives and experts in the field of executive compensation in South African SOEs. Semi-
structured interviews were preferred, since they usually have an overarching topic, general 
themes, targeted issues and specific questions, with a predetermined sequence for their 
occurrence (Lee, 1999). In addition, a conversational interview technique was used to collect 
data. The conversational interview technique was deemed suitable since its major characteristic 
 is its openness. It also allows the researcher to address several issues of thematising, design, 
situation, criteria for evaluation and transcription as they relate to conversational interviews (Lee, 
1999, p.81) 
 
Procedure 
Participants were interviewed in a secured office away from their desks and free from 
interruption by a ringing phone or working colleagues. The researcher asked permission to use a 
tape recorder to capture a verbatim account of the interview for processing at a later stage. The 
participants consented to have interviews tape-recorded. However, the participants remained 
anonymous. 
 
Trustworthiness 
The issue of trustworthiness in qualitative research is important to the practice of good science 
(Streubert and Carpenter 1999, p.61). Several writers on research methods have demonstrated 
how qualitative researchers can incorporate measures that deal with these issues in their own 
qualitative studies (Shenton, 2004). For this study, Guba's model for qualitative research was 
used with the aim of ensuring the trustworthiness of the findings. The four criteria to ensure the 
trustworthiness of this research were credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability 
(Guba, 1981; Krefting, 1991; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Terre Blanche and Durrheim, 2002). 
In addressing credibility, investigators attempt to demonstrate that a true picture of the 
phenomenon under scrutiny is being presented (Shenton, 2004). In this study, to achieve 
credibility, the interviews were all tape-recorded and notes were transcribed with the assistance 
of a professional transcriptionist. The transcribed responses were checked against the tape 
recordings for consistency, in order to ensure the integrity of the research data (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994; Krefting, 1991; Schurink; Fouche and de Vos, 2011; Terre Blanche and 
Durrheim, 2002). As a follow-up from the initial interviews, the researcher wrote analytic notes 
and held analytic meetings with other experts in qualitative analysis to capture the initial thinking 
and tentative ideas about the data. This was done to ensure that the views of the participants and 
the reconstruction of those views by the researcher coincided (Schurink et al., 2011. 
Transferability in this study was achieved by the researcher richly describing the data and 
providing exact definitions of constructs as determined by the literature reviewed and cross-
 validation with experts in executive compensation. To achieve dependability, the researcher 
entered the interviews with a predetermined interview schedule containing specific questions 
with the intention to pursue emergent topics and to probe more deeply than the initially planned 
questions (Lee, 1999, p.62). Subsequently, the researcher documented the research process in a 
logical and well-structured manner for ease of coherence and understanding (Schurink et al., 
2011). Finally, regarding conformability, bracketing was used throughout the data collection 
process so that the researcher could suspend any preconceived notions or personal experiences 
that would unduly influence what he ‘heard' the participants saying (Saunders et al., 2012). 
 
Data analysis  
Thematic analysis was adopted as a method to analyse data. As described by Braun and Clarke 
(2006), thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) 
within data. It is for its contextualist strength that thematic analysis was chosen for the current 
research. The mode of thematic analysis followed for this study was the meaning condensation 
technique (Lee, 1994). As the name suggests, meaning condensation involves data reduction, 
while simultaneously articulating the key emerging themes from transcripts containing interview 
data (Boyatzis, 1998; Braun and Clark, 2006; Lee, 1994; Yin, 1994).  
Meaning condensation as adopted in this study involved five basic steps (Lee, 1994). First, the 
author read the entire transcript of the interviews. Secondly, portions of the text that were judged 
to relate to an identifiable theme were identified. Subsequently, the natural meaning units were 
clearly defined and arranged into themes with subthemes based on the actual responses of the 
participants, using a software package (Atlas ti.). 
  
 Findings 
Findings were condensed under the two variables investigated, namely influence and reciprocity. 
Under influence, three themes emerged, namely social capital, intellectual capital and social 
comparison. Two main themes emerged under reciprocity, namely the pay-performance 
relationship and role complexity. Lastly, the political-symbolic role of the executive emerged as 
the theme that described the relationship between influence and reciprocity. The findings are 
presented next.  
 
Influence 
Social capital as influence in the determination of executive compensation 
Table 1 indicates the broad theme and the sub-theme, including examples of original responses 
that were analysed. 
Table 1: Social capital 
 
 
Theme Sub-themes  Response 
 
Social capital as influence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Executives’ 
relationships and 
stakeholder 
engagement 
 
 
 
“… being able to engage a stakeholder is critical because 
this is about relationships and making sure that you 
leverage into the customer …“(RP2) 
 
“… So you have to manage stakeholders that are very 
critical to the economy of the country to grow. And that 
becomes a big determinant of the level of compensation, 
“(RP9) 
 
“… this is somebody who is able to leverage 
relationships, this is somebody who is a strategist, 
somebody who is international savvy in the sense that he 
can talk to investors from China that are coming to help 
us build work for locomotives for one of our operating 
divisions …" “(RP7) 
(RP stands for research participant) 
The main theme that emerged from the interviews was the executives’ social capital as an 
influence in executive compensation. Social capital was described as the executives’ 
relationships and network with key government stakeholders. The executives’ influence was 
expressed as the ability to command respect among their peers and the international community 
at large. Thus, social capital was perceived as the executives’ ability to network and engage with 
critical stakeholders for the success of the organisation and in turn, be rewarded accordingly. 
 Similarly, the importance of the stakeholder relationship was extended to relate to the executives’ 
ability to subscribe to the regulatory bodies that govern SOEs. 
Overall, the responses of the participants indicated that executive compensation is determined 
by executives’ ability to engage with various stakeholders who are critical to the delivery of the 
organisations’ strategic intent that would, in turn, influence the level of executives’ 
compensation. Thus, the executive is able to influence his or her level of compensation through 
social networking.  
 
Intellectual capital as influence in the determination of executive compensation 
Table 2 indicates the broad theme and the sub-theme, including examples of original responses 
that were analysed.  
Table 2: Intellectual capital 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research participants were of the opinion that executives with advanced institutional knowledge 
of the organisation were at an advantage in negotiating better pay and increases than executives 
who had joined the organisation later. They believed that knowledge acquired over time on the 
functioning of an SOE and the environmental legislation that governed such entities gave an 
 
Theme Sub-themes  Response 
 
Intellectual 
capital 
as influence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Leveraging on 
institutional 
knowledge 
 
"… somebody that has a big picture view of the 
company.” (RP8) 
 
“… there is a lot of institutional knowledge which we need 
somebody to leverage on and to be able to deliver." (RP4) 
 
"… we look at the experience … what the incumbent has 
done previously …" (RP9) 
 
" … as a state-owned enterprise you need to be aware of 
the environmental legislation, you need to be aware of 
PFMA, Treasury regulations." (RP3) 
 
"… there is a lot of socio-economic factors at play. It has 
to be somebody that understands our labour union 
environment because a strike could have a catastrophic 
impact on the economy. “(RP11) 
 
"It is purely based on the knowledge and on what you 
could offer as an incumbent …”(RP6) 
 executive an edge to negotiate for better compensation, compared to other executives who might 
be lacking such institutional knowledge. In addition, research participants contended that as part 
of institutional knowledge, the educational background together with acquired experience 
facilitated understanding of the socio-economic factors that put an executive at an advantage to 
‘manage effectively and in turn be rewarded accordingly’.  
Overall, it is apparent from the responses of the participants that an executive is able, to some 
extent, to influence his or her level of compensation using institutional knowledge. Such 
knowledge is acquired over time on the functioning of an SOE and the environmental legislation 
that governs the entities. Executives use acquired institutional knowledge to negotiate for better 
compensation, compared to that of other executives who may be lacking such knowledge.  
 
Social comparison as influence in the determination of executive compensation 
Table 3 indicates the broad theme and the sub-theme, including examples of original responses 
that were analysed. 
Table 3: Social comparison 
 
 
The theme that emerged in the interview was the role of comparison as a key determinant in 
setting executive compensation. Research participants contended that SOEs deliberated on which 
peer groups to consider when setting executive compensation relevant to a specific executive. 
However, arriving at the level of a suitable compensation package was in most cases informed 
Theme 
Sub-themes  Response 
 
Social 
comparison 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Benchmarking 
 
"…  I probably can be able to easily find an executive of human 
capital than find a CFO." (RP8) 
 
“… In our organisation branding is important, thus the 
communication executive would be considered to be very important, 
maybe more than a finance person…" (RP4) 
 
"… When you talk resource management, the CFO will have more 
responsibilities to manage financial resources compared to the 
human resources executive” (RP10) 
 
"… the corporate services executive, which is responsible for more 
than what a human capital executive does outside our organisation? 
So they are in charge of the human capital, in charge of marketing, 
in charge of IT and facilities. So we look at what’s the content of 
their jobs, and what is the influence to the organisation as a whole 
…”(RP 9) 
 by the job function of the executive compared to other executive positions within and beyond 
the SOE. Research participants mentioned that the setting of executive compensation involved 
the remuneration committee that was tasked with making sure that the proposed packages were 
competitive enough to attract and retain an executive.  
Research participants highlighted the fact that it was important to identify the correct market or 
industry in order to make comparisons and to benchmark executive compensation accordingly. 
However, research respondents mentioned that the competitive market according to which 
executive compensation could be set was not clearly defined for ease of reference and 
comparison. Overall, the nature of the market or typical industry that SOEs used to set executive 
compensation was important. In order to identify the correct benchmark, SOEs employed the 
services of external consultants to assist them. Consultants are used to interpreting the trends and 
to come up with estimates of executive compensation. This would seem to mean that the type of 
industry would be more influential in the determination of the level of executive compensation.  
 
Reciprocity  
Pay performance relationship 
Table 4 indicates the broad theme and the sub-theme, including examples of original responses 
that were analysed. 
Table 4: Pay performance relationship 
 
Theme                 Sub-theme                    Response 
 
Pay performance relationship 
 
 
Shareholder 
expectations 
 
"… the executive understands that you have to do certain 
things that give investors the comfort that the organisation 
is run very well, which is efficient with all the measures, the 
internal controls are there. You are taking care of the 
brand. “(RP7) 
 
… the comfort that the organisation is run on well-
established business principles and processes …" (RP2) 
 
"… executives should perform their deliverables in terms of 
what is stipulated in the strategy … the annual salary 
increase will be linked or will be performance based …" 
(RP6) 
 
The Board do the final approval of the executive 
compensation. So they will provide inputs, they will provide 
a whole range of things they feel should be taken into 
consideration from the strategy point of view .…" (RP12) 
    
 Research participants perceived remuneration as being determined by performance measures that 
are aligned to the strategic intent and business plans of the organisation. The strategy details key 
performance indicators and focuses the effort and attention of individuals on the strategic 
deliverables for long-term sustainability, as well as on short-term business plan deliverables for 
profitability, both of which are imperative to shareholder value creation. Thus, an executive will 
be compensated for delivering results according to the performance targets of the organisation.  
Overall, executive compensation is perceived as performance-driven and depends on its 
affordability for the organisation. Market conditions, which determine the supply of and demand 
for executive skills, also play a role in the determination of executive compensation. 
 
Role complexity 
Table 5 indicates the broad theme and the sub-themes, including examples of original responses 
that were analysed. 
Table 5: Role complexity 
 
 
Theme Sub-themes  Response 
 
Role complexity as influence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Impact 
considerations 
 
 
 
"… . with the organisation that needs to be turned around, 
you may decide to compensate the chief executive more, 
because turning around the organisation is different from 
maintaining what is already the status quo." (RP2) 
 
“… if this executive makes a decision which is wrong, 
what would be the impact on the economy …" (RP4) 
 
"… For a company like ours which has a definite link to 
the performance of the entire South African economy, the 
role of an executive becomes a critical factor in the 
determination of pay." (RP8) 
 
"… not all executives are created equally. You always 
consider what the impact of the role to the position is … 
and then reward the executive accordingly" (RP10) 
 
 
Respondents viewed the complexity of the role as influential in the determination of executive 
pay. The complexity of the role of an executive was viewed in terms of its impact not only on 
the organisation in relation to other executive positions but also in terms of its contribution to 
the economy of the country. According to the research participants, the executive’s role and 
mandate are intended for social and economic advancement.  
 In addition, the research participants emphasised the impact of the role as the main differentiator 
in the level of executive compensation, but also extended the impact element to include the 
dynamics of size and complexity of the organisation as influential in the determination of 
executive compensation. 
Overall, the complexity of the role as an influence on the level of compensation involves the 
executives’ ability to manage size not only in terms of the number of employees but also in terms 
of the complexity and ability to generate and manage large amounts of revenue. In turn, the 
challenge and difficulty of the position in generating the necessary revenue are reflected in the 
level of compensation due to the executive.  
 
Relationship between influence and reciprocity 
Political symbolic role 
Table 6 indicates the broad theme and the sub-theme, including examples of original responses 
that were analysed. 
Table 6: Political symbolic role 
 
Theme                 Sub-theme                    Response 
 
Political symbolic role 
 
 
Political mandate 
 
 
“The Minister has always intended to set parameters for 
SOEs for a long time. So when we give him our final 
recommendations for salaries for noting,  he does come 
back with comments and say listen beware of the media, 
and if you going to give high bonuses you must 
understand its implications to the public”(RP8) 
 
"… we run the risk of offending the Minister should we 
dare to compete with the private sector by paying huge 
salaries. Taking that risk will invite unnecessary press 
attention. And the media also becomes a challenge.” 
(RP2) 
 
 
 
The relationship between influence and reciprocity finds expression in the complexity of the 
political role played by the executive. Research participants highlighted the importance of the 
political mandate that executives should carry in order to fulfil the developmental mandate of 
the SOEs. The critical stakeholder is the government represented by the Minister, who indirectly 
 influences the level of executive compensation. Executive compensation is expected to be in 
alignment with the expectations of the Minister and members of the public.  
The overall finding is that executives are compensated for the political role they play to the 
benefit of the SOEs in meeting their obligation in terms of the developmental mandate. 
Moreover, it is important that executive compensation does not exceed the expectations of 
members of the public and does not spark unnecessary debates about social inequality.  
 
Discussion and conclusion 
The findings support the role of the two main elements under study, namely influence and 
reciprocity, in the determination of executive compensation. Influence has been described in 
terms of the social capital, intellectual capital and comparability of an executive in relation to 
compensation. Reciprocity has been described by the pay-performance relationship and the 
complexity of the executive role, while the relationship between influence and reciprocity has 
been described by the political-symbolic role of the executives in the determination of executive 
compensation. 
 
Influence 
Based on the findings, one of the themes that emerged under the heading of influence is that 
executive compensation is influenced by the social capital of the executive. Social capital has 
been described as consisting of the social networks established by the executive. The social 
networks and stakeholder engagement are mostly political in nature. Thus, the executive is 
recognised and rewarded for his or her political networks and leadership role demonstrated in 
translating the vision of the SOE to be adopted by employees and accepted by the broader 
stakeholders who include the main shareholders (the government) and the third parties 
(communities) they serve.  
The findings of the study seem to align with previous literature. For example, Aslan and 
Grinstein (2011) found that political networks are positively related to levels of compensation. 
That is, the more the executive is able to establish a network with most of the critical decision 
makers, especially those with political influence, the easier it becomes for the executive to carry 
out his or her mandate and thus deliver the required performance. With an increase in the level 
 of performance comes compensation commensurate with the level of influence exerted by the 
executive. 
The findings of the study also indicated that executives with advanced institutional knowledge 
of the organisation were at an advantage in negotiating for better pay and increases. Institutional 
knowledge finds expression in the intellectual capital of the executive. As explained by the 
research respondents, part of institutional knowledge consists of experience acquired over time 
on the functioning of an SOE and the ability to apply this and comply with the environmental 
legislation that governs such entities. Based on the findings, it would also appear that intellectual 
capital is not considered in isolation, but to the extent to which it contributes to the ability of the 
executive to establish the necessary social and political networks and to contribute to the 
developmental mandate of the organisation. Overall, institutional knowledge was perceived as 
the edge used by the executive to negotiate for better pay. 
The findings of the study seem to corroborate previous studies. For example, Greve et al. (2010) 
contend that the more knowledgeable and experienced the executive is, the better the 
compensation. Similarly, figurehead theory considers an executives’ political connectedness and 
social networks in general as the most important social capital that can be used to influence 
policy decisions that are in the interest of the organisation. 
The findings of the interviews also highlighted comparison of executives as another influential 
element in the determination of executive compensation. Research participants mentioned that a 
number of referent and comparable peer groups were considered when SOEs set executive 
compensation. The findings of the current study seem to concur with those of previous studies. 
For example, social comparison theory focuses on determining which individuals or groups are 
likely to serve as referents when making comparisons (Graffin, Wade, Porac, and McNamee, 
2008; Wade, Porac, Pollock, and Graffin, 2006). As a result, executives with greater social status 
or connections than comparison groups would receive more favourable compensation (Belliveau, 
O’Reilly, and Wade, 1996; Westphal and Zajac, 1995). However, the findings of the current 
study revealed that the Minister as a representative of the Government and as a stakeholder had 
a direct influence on executive compensation. All SOEs had to check with the Minister, 
especially when the package seemed to be higher than expected. 
  
 Reciprocity 
Based on the findings, executive compensation is seen as resulting from a relationship between 
the achievement of performance targets aligned to the strategic intent and business plans of the 
SOE by the executive. The research respondents asserted that the strategic objectives focus on 
strategic deliverables for long-term sustainability, as well as on short-term business plan 
deliverables for profitability, both of which are imperative to shareholder value creation. In turn, 
the executive would be compensated for reaching the set performance targets. Thus, the 
determination of executive compensation is reciprocal in that the remuneration philosophy for 
the executive is designed to align remuneration with long-term shareholder growth and 
sustainable profitability of the SOE.  
Further, it seems from the participants' responses that executive compensation results from 
deliberations based on the mutual exchange that involves more than just the interaction between 
the executive and the organisation. The interactive process takes into consideration the 
complexity of the role of the executive and the extent of the collective engagement according to 
which the SOE would establish parity in executive compensation. These findings of the study 
again seem to align with previous studies. For example, according to Farid, Conte and Lazarus 
(2010), executive compensation does not flow from predictions of narrow self-interest. As 
captured by Rhee (2014), executive compensation is no longer purely a matter of private 
contracting. In other words, executives’ selfishness does not determine executive compensation.  
 
The relationship between influence and reciprocity in the determination of executive 
compensation 
The relationship between influence and reciprocity in the determination of executive 
compensation finds expression in the setting of executive compensation as a symbiotic exercise. 
Symbiosis in this context involves the incorporation of influence that facilitates the negotiation 
of expectations between an executive and the organisation, as well as an element of reciprocity, 
which defines the agreed amount of compensation to be given to the executive for the 
achievement of the predetermined set of performance targets. Thus, the makeup of the pay mix 
depends on the complexity of the political role of the executive that serves the best interest of 
the organisation, which in this context, is the ability of the SOE to meet its developmental 
mandate to society. The findings on the relationship between influence and reciprocity seem to 
 align with previous studies. For example, according to Aslan and Grinstein (2011), Francis et al. 
(2009), Horton et al. (2012) and Li et al. (2008), influence and reciprocal exchange produce 
beneficial effects for both the individual executive and the organisation.  
 
Overall implications of influence and reciprocity as determinants of executive 
compensation 
The findings of this study, unlike those of previous economic and financial studies, have 
demonstrated that executive compensation is a product of endogenous and exogenous factors. 
Endogenous factors include an important individual attribute such as the executive's influence. 
The executive is recognised and rewarded for his or her leadership role demonstrated in 
translating the vision of the SOE to be adopted by employees. Exogenous factors entail the 
accepted predetermined performance standards between the executive and the broader 
stakeholders who include the main shareholders (the government), and expectations from the 
third parties (communities) they serve. 
As an endogenous factor, the determination of the executive compensation process finds 
expression in the managerial power theory and the figurehead theory that illustrate how the 
individual executive uses his/her influence and political social networks to achieve 
organisational objectives required to determine compensation. As an exogenous factor, the 
determination of executive compensation finds expression in the social comparison theory, 
which demonstrates how executive compensation entails consideration of the executive's 
counterparts, to arrive at the final compensation package. 
However, the findings of this study have demonstrated how executive compensation not only 
depends on the power of the executive as referred to by the managerial power theory, but also 
takes into consideration the executive's role in meeting expectations from the organisation as 
articulated by the social mandate. The social mandate dictates the psychological contract, which 
determines the performance expectations required between the executive and other critical 
stakeholders. Above all, the social mandate serves as a criterion used to determine the 
compensation level of an executive. 
In addition, the findings of the current study have demonstrated that executive compensation is 
contextual and reciprocal in nature. That is, the determination of executive compensation 
involves not only the strength of the social networks and political connectedness as alluded to 
 by the figurehead theory, but also compliance with expectations from the critical stakeholders 
such as the minister as the representative of the government and the members of the public. 
Overall, this study has demonstrated how socio-psychology is able to surpass the economic and 
accounting disciplines. For example, the socio-psychological approach provides a more detailed 
description of the nature and application of executive compensation from a process perspective 
than the economic and financial sciences do. The economic and financial sciences are limited in 
that they emphasise economic or agency perspectives focusing on how executive pay varies with 
performance while ignoring the manner in which executive compensation is decided.  
The findings of this study contribute to the advancement of compensation theory and research 
by introducing an alternative perspective by which compensation in SOEs can be analysed. 
Findings of this study centre on the sociological conception of the process in the determination 
of executive compensation. This theoretical analysis stresses the abstract specificity of the 
process and the employment relationship between the executive, his/her organisation and the 
external environment in the determination of executive compensation. 
In particular, the findings of this study have demonstrated how the process of determining 
compensation is characterised by a significant departure from conventional management 
practices that emphasise economic and accounting factors. The findings of this study provide 
new insight into the conceptualisation of the process and the possible relationships of the 
constructs (influence and reciprocity) as determinants of executive compensation. 
The findings also contribute to the field of personnel psychology. As a sub-discipline of 
industrial and organisational psychology, personnel psychology is concerned with the scientific 
study of individual differences in work settings, and includes activities such as employee reward 
and remuneration, employee performance evaluation, attracting and retaining scarce and critical 
talent, and encouraging adherence to employment-related legislation, among others (Schreuder 
and Coetzee, 2010). As a contribution to the field of personnel psychology, the findings of this 
research serve as a baseline study towards understanding the development and implementation 
practices on compensation.  
In addition, the practical implications of the findings of this study seem to place more emphasis 
on the determination of executive compensation as a collective process. That is, the 
determination of executive compensation is not merely the result of a selfish demand by the 
executive, but of a mutual agreement with all the other stakeholders involved in the process. A 
 more conclusive understanding of the process of setting executive compensation is therefore seen 
as a socially constructed process that takes into consideration the effects of influence and the 
reciprocal nature of the relationships of all stakeholders in arriving at the level of executive pay.  
However, the challenge that arises from the current study is how to measure executive influence 
and its impact on executive compensation in a manner that is standard across all SOEs. There is 
also a need for further study on how to measure the level of reciprocal interaction as a 
determinant of executive compensation. 
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